JOSE-IGNACIO CALDERON
Economist and Researcher
Paper · Working Paper

Post-Match Learning and Incentives under Stable Matching: Turnover Margins in Teacher Labor Markets

Abstract

Teacher turnover is a persistent and costly feature of education labor markets, particularly among early-career teachers. We model the hiring of teachers into schools as a many-to-one, unconstrained matching market, and show that a mechanism reduces turnover for every preference profile if and only if it is stable, and no mechanism, stable or not, leaves fewer teachers affected by turnover threats than the teacher-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.

Status
Working Paper
Date
November 2026
PDF

Citation & BibTeX

Calderon, J. I., D. Carrasco, A. Diaz-Sacco, D. Lopez-Gonzalez, and M. Salas (2026). Post-Match Learning and Incentives under Stable Matching: Turnover Margins in Teacher Labor Markets. Working Paper.
DOI: [10.xxxx/xxxxx]
@unpublished{Calderon2026PostMatchLearningTurnover,
  title={Post-Match Learning and Incentives under Stable Matching: Turnover Margins in Teacher Labor Markets},
  author={Calderon, Jose-Ignacio and Carrasco, Diego and Diaz-Sacco, Alessandra and Lopez-Gonzalez, Dany and Salas, Macarena},
  year={2026},
  note={Working paper}
}